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An outbreak caused by the SARS-CoV-2 Delta variant 
(B.1.617.2) spread from one inpatient in a secondary 
care hospital to three primary care facilities, resulting 
in 58 infections including 18 deaths in patients and 45 
infections in healthcare workers (HCW). Only one of 
the deceased cases was fully vaccinated. Transmission 
occurred despite the use of personal protective equip-
ment by the HCW, as advised in national guidelines, 
and a high two-dose COVID-19 vaccination coverage 
among permanent staff members in the COVID-19 
cohort ward.
Introduction
The severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 
(SARS-CoV-2) Delta variant of concern (Phylogenetic 
Assignment of Named Global Outbreak (Pango) lineage 
designation B.1.617.2) has been suggested to be more 
transmissible than the Alpha (B.1.1.7) variant [1], which 
is more transmissible than the wild-type SARS-CoV-2 
virus [2-4]. We describe here an outbreak caused by 
the Delta variant that originated from one inpatient in 
a secondary care hospital and spread within the hos-
pital and to three primary care facilities; we describe 
our experiences in controlling it. Cases were detected 
among patients, healthcare workers (HCW) and in 
the community. Both symptomatic and asymptomatic 
infections were found among vaccinated HCW, and sec-
ondary transmission occurred from those with symp-
tomatic infections despite use of personal protective 
equipment (PPE).
Setting and outbreak onset
Tavastia Proper healthcare district (HD), with a popu-
lation of 171,000, is one of the 20 geographically and 
administratively defined HD in Finland. This HD has 
one central hospital providing secondary care and 
six healthcare facilities providing primary care, one 
of which is a district hospital while the other five are 
healthcare centre wards. The central hospital has 184 
beds in eight wards and an intensive care unit (ICU). 
In the central hospital, patients who have symptoms 
compatible with coronavirus disease (COVID-19) are 
tested upon admission with a nasopharyngeal SARS-
CoV-2 real time reverse transcriptase (RT-PCR) test 
(Supplementary data). Patients with a high clinical sus-
picion of COVID-19 are treated in isolation until there 
are at least two negative tests 24 hours apart.
In early May 2021, a patient with COVID-19-associated 
pneumonia and travel history in Asia was hospital-
ised for 4 days in the COVID-19 cohort in Ward 1 of 
the central hospital. This index patient had a positive 
test for SARS-CoV-2 9 days before hospitalisation and 
was admitted to an isolation room. Six days after the 
discharge of the index patient, two secondary case-
patients tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 in Wards 1 
and 2 (Figure). Exposed roommates (n = 8) and unvac-
cinated healthcare workers (n = 11, 10 of whom were 
HCW students) were quarantined. As additional cases 
were detected, Wards 1, 2 and 3 were closed from new 
admissions. All patients were treated with contact and 
droplet precautions three days following the identifica-
tion of the first secondary cases.
The outbreak spread to four wards in the central hos-
pital. According to the place of exposure, most cases 
(31 case-patients and 21 HCW-cases) were in Wards 
1 and 2, one case-patient was in Ward 3 and seven 
cases (four case-patients and three HCW-cases) were 
in another ward located on a different floor (Ward 4). 
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Figure.
Outbreak caused by the SARS-CoV-2 Delta variant from one infected index patient in a central hospital, Tavastia Proper 
healthcare district, Finland, May 2021 (n = 103)
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coronavirus 2.
A) Start of the outbreak in Ward 1 (COVID-19 cohort), 2 and 3 in the central hospital. The rooms of the index case (1), case-patients 2-8 and 
other case-patients (> 8, marked with x) are indicated.
B) Hospitalisations in the central hospital and transfers to primary healthcare facilities for the index patient and case-patients 2–8 during 
the outbreak. A pink diamond indicates the date of SARS-CoV-2 laboratory confirmation and the black triangle indicates the date of death. 
The index patient had a SARS-CoV-2-positive test several days before hospital admission. Case-patient 2 was not laboratory-confirmed for 
SARS-CoV-2 before death, but had symptoms and transmitted the disease to a family member, healthcare workers and a roommate, who were 
all laboratory-confirmed for SARS-CoV-2.
C) Epidemic curve showing case-patients and HCW-cases by date when a positive SARS-CoV-2 sample was taken and place of exposure. Case-
patients whose diagnosis was made after discharge from the exposure ward are marked with #. The date of diagnosis was missing for three 
HCW-cases in Primary care facility 1. Three HCW-cases who had worked both in Wards 1 and 2 are marked accordingly.
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Exposure to SARS-CoV-2 occurred in almost every 
unit of the central hospital. Some exposed patients 
had been transferred to four of the six primary care 
facilities. In three of these four facilities, the outbreak 
spread through transfers that took place before the 
outbreak was detected. In the fourth facility, the trans-
fer happened after outbreak detection and the exposed 
patient was quarantined and there was no further 
spread.
Sequencing detection of the Delta variant
The sequencing results of the index patient as well 
as results of Case-patients 4 and 5, a staff member 
exposed to Case-patient 2, and several other (n = 32) 
outbreak-related samples showed that the outbreak 
was caused by the Delta variant (GISAID Accession IDs: 
EPI_ISL_2557176-EPI_ISL_2557210) [5].
In total, 317 laboratory findings positive for SARS-
CoV-2 were notified to the National Infectious Diseases 
Register (NIDR) in Tavastia Proper HD in May 2021; 44% 
(141/317) were sequenced (NIDR, data taken 28 June 
2021) and 41% (58/141) were the Delta variant, all but 
one with known transmission chains.
Ethical statement
As the data displayed in this article is a result of an 
outbreak investigation (legal task of Finnish Institute 
for Health and Welfare and HD according to the 
Communicable Disease Act), ethical approval was not 
needed.
Extent and spread of the outbreak
We defined a case-patient or HCW-case as a person 
with a positive SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR test with a known 
exposure to a SARS-CoV-2 outbreak, either when 
admitted (patient) or when working in one of the four 
healthcare facilities (HCW).
In total, 58 case-patients were detected (Table 1), 18 
of whom died. For the deceased case-patients, the 
median age was 80 years (range: 62–96), 11 were men, 
one was vaccinated with two doses, 11 with one dose 
and six were unvaccinated. For the majority of the 
deceased case-patients, COVID-19 likely contributed to 
their death. All had an underlying condition requiring 
hospital treatment prior to COVID-19 infection. There 
were 45 HCW-cases in four healthcare facilities (the 
central hospital and three primary care facilities; Table 
1). There were no hospitalisations or deaths among the 
HCW-cases. Secondary infections (n = 62) occurred 
also in community in close contacts of case-patients 
and HCW-cases.
At the time of the outbreak, 24 of 29 permanent HCW 
in Ward 1 were fully vaccinated with two doses of 
Comirnaty (BNT162b2 mRNA, BioNTech-Pfizer, Mainz, 
Germany/New York, United States), two of 29 had 
received one dose of Comirnaty when preceded by lab-
oratory-confirmed SARS-CoV-2 within 6 months, two of 
29 had received one dose of Comirnaty, and one of 29 
was unvaccinated. In Ward 2, all (17/17) permanent HCW 
were fully vaccinated with Comirnaty. Vaccinations 













Age in years (range) 73 (30–97) 38 (19–62) -
Sex: men (%) 28 (48) 0 (0)
Deaths (%) 18 (31) 0 (0)
Vaccinated against SARS-CoV-2a
Two doses 2 18 20
One dose 42 6 48
Unvaccinated 14 21 35
Place of exposure to SARS-CoV-2 
Central hospitalb 36 26 62
Primary care facility 1 13 9 22
Primary care facility 2 3 3 6
Primary care facility 3 6 7 13
COVID-19: coronavirus disease; HCW: healthcare workers; SARS-CoV-2: severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2.
a The vast majority of HCW (>90%) were vaccinated with Comirnaty (BNT162b2 mRNA, BioNTech-Pfizer, Mainz, Germany/New York, United 
States).
b Central hospital includes Wards 1-4.
Table 1.
Characteristics of COVID-19 case-patients and healthcare worker-cases, Tavastia Proper health district, Finland, May 2021 
(n = 103)
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2021, and thereafter the interval was extended to 12 
weeks.
There were a few patients who contracted COVID-19 
who had stayed solely in their single or two-person 
room and were cared for by fully vaccinated HCW (with 
universal masking), suggesting transmission from a 
vaccinated HCW-case. All staff members in Wards 1, 
2 and 3 were screened for SARS-CoV-2 by RT-PCR the 
week after outbreak detection; screening in Ward 4 
on the other floor was done the following week after 
the detection of secondary cases. Five asymptomatic 
infections were identified among fully vaccinated staff 
members; one developed symptoms only after the 
positive RT-PCR screening test (CT value: 17) and four 
remained asymptomatic (CT values: 28, 32, 33 and 34, 
suggesting low infectivity [6]). There was no second-
ary transmission from the four identified asymptomatic 
fully vaccinated HCW.
There was high vaccine coverage among permanent 
staff in the central hospital, but lower for HCW in 
primary healthcare facilities and among students in 
training and staff members who had no direct patient 
contact (Table 2). This is in line with the strict national 
COVID-19 vaccination strategy during a period of lim-
ited vaccine supply, which emphasised the prioritisa-
tion of HCW based on their statute and job description 
in order to have more vaccines available for elderly 
people and medical risk groups.
Among the fully vaccinated, symptomatic HCW-cases 
in the central hospital (n = 8), there were five cases 
for whom we had follow-up data unconfounded by 
other exposures to evaluate secondary transmission. 
Two HCW-cases with symptoms transmitted the infec-
tion to their household contacts and patients and one 
who also infected a HCW colleague within 4 days from 
the symptom onset. One HCW-case with symptoms 
transmitted the infection only to a household contact 
nearly 2 weeks after the disease onset of the HCW-
case. Two HCW-cases did not infect anyone. We were 
not able to obtain complete data for the secondary 
transmission from all case-patients.
Of all the identified HCW-cases, five remained com-
pletely asymptomatic. The remaining HCW (n = 36, 
information missing for n = 4) had at least mild symp-
toms that, for a few, developed after screening. At the 
very beginning of the outbreak in Ward 1 and 2 and 
later in Ward 4, there was transmission that we could 
not trace; this could only be explained by infected 
HCW, suggesting that we most likely were not able to 
identify all HCW cases with mild or no symptoms.
Infection control measures
In the central hospital, COVID-19 patients are cohorted 
in Ward 1, which has 28 beds in 14 rooms. Four iso-
lation rooms are equipped with negative pressure, 
while for the other 10 rooms, incoming air enters from 
a common supply line through a room-specific pipe 
and outgoing air exits through a room-specific pipe to 
a common exit line. The air supply and exit lines for 
Ward 1 are separated from those of Ward 2 and Ward 3 
located at the same floor. Some staff members, medi-
cal doctors, physiotherapists and cleaning staff are 
shared by Ward 1 and 2.
HCW used PPE (visor, long sleeved apron, gloves and 
surgical mask) in COVID-19 patients’ care. FFP2/3 respi-
rators were used in aerosol-generating procedures and 
intensive care. Surgical masks were used by HCW in all 
contexts with patient contact (i.e. universal masking). 
Visitors were only allowed if they were asymptomatic 
and they were advised in hand hygiene and surgical 
mask wearing. Patients were encouraged to use surgi-
cal masks.
HCW occupation Vaccinateda Unvaccinated Total
2 doses 1 dose
HCW with direct patient contactb 17 4 7 28
HCW students 0 0 8 8
Other staffc 1 2 6 9
Total 18 6 21 45
HCW: healthcare worker; SARS-CoV-2: severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2.
a The vast majority of HCW (> 90%) were vaccinated with Comirnaty (BNT162b2 mRNA, BioNTech-Pfizer, Mainz, Germany/New York, United 
States).
b Includes 2 HCW with one dose of vaccine and previous laboratory-confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infection.
c Includes hospital cleaners and secretaries.
Table 2.




Since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic and as of 7 
July 2021 in Finland, the cumulative number of labora-
tory-confirmed COVID-19 cases was 97,049 and that of 
COVID-19-related deaths was 976 (population: 5.5 mil-
lion inhabitants). Before the outbreak described here, 
the 14-day incidence for laboratory-confirmed SARS-
CoV-2 infections was 57 per 100,000 inhabitants for 
Tavastia Proper HD, and 52 cases per 100,000 inhab-
itants in the total Finnish population (source: NIDR). 
During the two weeks preceding the outbreak, 30% 
(856/2,848) of SARS-CoV-2-positive samples in Finland 
were sequenced (Supplementary data); of these, 57 
were consistent with the Delta variant. Up to this point, 
there had only been one case of SARS-CoV-2 Delta 
variant in Tavastia Proper HD with a known transmis-
sion chain and no secondary transmission. Of note, 
at the start of the outbreak, vaccination coverage was 
the same in Tavastia Proper HD as in all of Finland i.e. 
35% for the first dose and 4% for the second dose. The 
majority of those vaccinated were in the older age and 
medical risk groups.
This outbreak, which was caused by the SARS-CoV-2 
Delta variant and led to 18 deaths in elderly people, 
occurred in four healthcare facilities despite the use of 
PPE, increasing vaccine coverage and universal mask-
ing by HCW. The technical department of the hospital 
did not deem possible that ventilation could explain 
the outbreak. Direct and indirect contact transmission 
are not considered to have an important role in SARS-
CoV-2 transmission, compared to droplet transmission 
[7]. Pre-symptomatic yet infectious COVID-19 patients 
with varying incubation periods made it difficult to con-
tain transmission both in the community and health-
care settings. It is possible that transmission occurred 
from asymptomatic/pre-symptomatic HCW to patients 
and other HCW. Although the first case-patients were 
diagnosed within 24 hours from symptom onset, 
the delay was enough for the outbreak to spread via 
patient transfer.
Breakthrough infections with the Delta variant and 
further transmission from fully vaccinated, sympto-
matic HCW occurred. Secondary transmission followed 
similar asymmetry as described with SARS-CoV-2 in 
unvaccinated individuals [8-10]. A recent study sug-
gests reduced vaccine effectiveness of 36% against 
symptomatic disease caused by the Delta variant after 
one dose of Comirnaty vaccine [11], but excellent pro-
tection after full course; depending on disease sever-
ity, Comirnaty vaccine provides 88–92% protection 
against the Delta variant [11,12], and we saw similar 
rates among the fully vaccinated HCW in Ward 1.
To control the outbreak, surgical masks were replaced 
by FFP2 respirators when HCW are in close contact with 
a laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 patient, as supported 
by literature [10,13,14]. Previously FFP2/3 respirators 
were only used in aerosol-generating procedures and 
intensive care units. The Finnish national guidelines 
regarding use of PPE when treating patients with 
COVID-19 were changed accordingly based on ongo-
ing discussion [15], even though we could not prove 
the airborne transmission during the outbreak. This 
was supported by the current good availability of FFP2 
respirators.
In conclusion, this outbreak demonstrated that, 
despite full vaccination and universal masking of 
HCW, breakthrough infections by the Delta variant via 
symptomatic and asymptomatic HCW occurred, caus-
ing nosocomical infections. As the Delta variant con-
tinues to spread in Europe, we suggest that utilization 
of FFP2/3 respirators while treating COVID-19 patients 
should be included in national guidelines.
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